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into the Year Books; we can recognize it in England, In Canada, in Australia, in our forty-eight states, and
there is that same model of approach
toward a legal controversy, that same
mode of handling the legal materials,
that same sure motive and AngloSaxon tendency to lay hold of concrete
experience and apply it no further
than the circumstances of a concrete
controversy require.
When you turn to the modern Roman
law you find an utterly different technique, applying written texts.
He
looks for a universal proposition and
he proceeds by a process of deduction
from a universal proposition as laid
down or not laid down in third century Rome. His books of authority
are the ancient oracle; his treatises
are commentaries upon the written
law.
But the oracle of the common law
is a judge. The books of authority are
reports of decided cases; the treatises
are commentaries upon decided cases.
And there is something that lies back
of this technic that seems to me a
most significant thing, and that is the
frame of mind of the common law
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lawyer, the frame of mind that leads
him always to keep his eye upon experience, to think of legal problems, to
think of controversies in terms of experience, to seek his solutions not in
ambitious programs for laying down
universalities, but rather in a cautious,
slow but surefooted application of experience to the exigencies of justice
for the time being.
Now in that frame of mind, in that
point of technique of the common law
lawyer, is the spirit of the common
law. I suggest to you that it is our
most precious legal and political, and
possibly social, possession; and isn't
it the duty of the common law lawyer
to see to it that in spite of the destructive and corrosive possibilities of legislation and administration, this frame
of mind, this technique, is preserved,
is handed down, to remain a living
instrument of justice among English
speaking peoples?
Reported for the Record
thru the courtesy of
C. P. Gehman
Shorthand Reporter
Denver, Colo.

Recent Statutes
By HENRY McALLIsrm, EsQ.

General Assembly in providing
HE
of the act
of the 1927
for wisdom
a "legislative
reference
office", designed to supervise the drafting of laws and the prevention of foolishly conceived and phrased statutes,
finds support in another act passed at
the same session, House Bill No. 321,
"by Representative Hill (by request)",
being "An Act to amend Sections 5162
and 5164 of the Compiled Laws of Colorado, 1921".
Section 5162 of the Compiled Laws

had been operative some twenty years,
and gave satisfactioi. It provided a
method of determining hirship to
real property in intestate estates, at
a minimum of trouble and expense, by
the filing of a petition therefor at any
time before order for final settlement
and inclusion of notice thereof in the
notice of final settlement. Section
5164 prescribed the effect of the decree upon heirs and their grantees.
The new act purports to extend the
proceedings to Inheritance of personal
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property as well as real estate, and it
may be that this is sometimes advisable, though the chief object of such
statutes is to settle title to land. The
act further provides that the petition
may be filed at any time before the
order for final settlement. Such an
order may be entered practically four
weeks before the date for final settlement, so as to permit the publication
for that period. But, after this provision, the act says that the court
shall fix a date "not less than six weeks
from the date of such order", and shall
cause a notice to be published for four
weeks, and to be mailed to non-resident heirs at least six weeks, before
the hearing. Furthermore, the result
is that where the petition for determination of heirship and the petition
for final settlement are filed on the
same day, the day fixed for final settlement must be at least six weeks in
the future.
As usual, the hypocritical practice
is followed of adding both the emergency clause and the safety-clutch, so
that the act.took effect upon its approval (March 26, 1927). The session
laws have not yet been published, and
it is doubtful whether many attorneys
are advised of this change in the law.
Of course, no emergency in fact existed and obviously the law was not
necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and
safety.
Since the present law relative to administration of estates was enacted in
1903, scarcely a session of the legislature has passed without amendments
thereof and instances might be cited
of amendments of the same section
time and again, sometimes at intervals of two years, only. Apparently
an attorney has a case not covered by
existing law or out of harmony with
it, and he has a statute passed to meet
his "emergency" regardless of its inconsistency with other provisions, and
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without expressly repealing them.
Soon, the law is again amended or a
new statute is enacted to fit another
case, and so on ad infinitum. As a result our estate laws are in hopeless
confusion on some subjects, and no
sooner does a lawyer accommodate
himself to a certain procedure than
another legislature repeals all he
knows. On the very question of determination of heirship, does the new
law repeal Compiled Laws, Sections
5165 and 5166, themselves enacted at
a different session from the new
amended Sections 5162 and 5164, and
relating to the same subject? If it
was the intention of the draftsman
that they should be repealed, why did
he not expressly provide, rather than
leave the same to the unsatisfactory
expression "all acts and parts of acts
in conflict herewith are hereby reThere is serious question
pealed."
whether the 1921 Compiled Laws do
not contain a number of sections relating to estates which were repealed
prior to their publication.
Finally, as to the emergency clause
and the safety-clutch, no more valuable service may be performed by the
new legislative reference director than
to discourage the use of these provisions, especially in statutes designed to change existing procedure in
courts or elsewhere, where, in fact, no
emergency or "immediate preservation of the public peace, health or
safety" can possibly be involved. The
danger that such statutes will be subjected to referendum (an iniquitous
procedure which is now practically
nullified by resort to a bare-faced
falsehood) is negligible. Those who
are called upon to conduct proceedings in courts or to advise clients, are
entitled to know (or, at least, to have
convenient access to means of knowing) what the practice is, and should
not be compelled to grope in the dark
for months intervening the adjournment of the legislature and the pub-
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lication of tle session laws, and then
be confronted with a statute completely revising procedure made immediately effective by these devices.
A recent conspicuous example is the
"Act concerning real property and to
render titles to real property and to
interests and estates therein, more
safe, secure and marketable".
This
act contains many admirable provisions and no objection is made to its
substance, but it is submitted that it
was not, as stated, necessary for the
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immediate preservation of the public
peace, health and safety, nor was
there any great emergency.
The legislative reference office cannot be a complete panacea, but if the
director appointed be a lawyer of
character, experience, independence,
capacity for hard and careful labor,
and above all possessed of proper
ideals and enthusiasm for his work,
and not a mere lame-duck who needs
a job, he can be of great aid to the
public and the bar.

Re: ColoradoRiver Waters and the Santa Fe
Compact
By FRED S.

CALDWELL, EsQ., OF THE DENVER BAR

ultimately confirmed by the
ILL the Santa Fe Compact, if
seven states and Congress, divest said states of their present sovereign power to grant appropriations of
water for use in the generation of
electrical power and vest that governmental function in the federal government exclusively?
The Compact does not undertake to
define the term "agricultural use", evidently upon the theory that it is so
well understood as to make definition
unnecessary. But "domestic use" is
defined to"include the use of water for
household, stock, municipal, milling, industrial and other like purposes, but shall exclude the generation of electrical power."
And following this is a provision (Art.
III, (e)) imposing an express inhibition upon all the seven states in these
words:
"The States of the Upper Division
shall -not withhold water, and the
States of the Lower Division shall

not ?require the delivery of water,
which cannot reasonably be applied to domestic and agricultural
-uses."

Although this inhibition is expressed
negatively its obvious meaning is this:
The states shall not have the right to
withhold or require the delivery of
water for "the generation of electrical
power."
But, although the states cannot withhold or require the delivery of water
for "the generation of electrical power", it is contemplated and intended
that the water shall be used for such
power purposes. Art. IV. (b) expressly provides that:
"Subject to the provisions of this
Compact, water of the Colorado
River System may be impounded
and used for the generation of
electrical power", subservient only
to the "dominant uses for agricultural and domestic purposes."
Now to "impound and use" said
water for the generation of electrical
power
necessarily
constitutes the

